International Anti-Money Laundering by Butler, Truman et al.
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International Anti-Money Laundering
TRUMAN BUTLER, GERARDO CALDERON-VILLEGAS, EMILY CHRISTIANSEN, AND
KAYLA McGEE*
I. Introduction
In 2013, International Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations continued to expand
in scope and enforceability. British and American multi-national financial institutions
were among those sanctioned and penalized by various regulators in the European Union
and United States in 2013 for AML violations. Regulators have increased scrutiny over
commercial organizations and have challenged institutions to filly implement appropriate
risk-based AML controls.
II. Global Enforcement Actions and Settlements
A. UNITED KINGDOM
1. EFG Private Bank Fined £4.2 Million for Failure to Implement Anti-Money Laundering
Controls for High-Risk Customers
On April 24, 2013, the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the or-
ganization responsible for "regulating firms and financial advisers so that markets and
financial systems remain sound, stable and resilient,"' fined EEG (the UK private banking
subsidiary of the Swiss global banking group EFGI) £4.2 million for failing to implement
AML controls for high-risk customers. 2 In 2011, the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
the predecessor to the FCA, began a review of how the bank was managing money-laun-
dering risks, and it found that about 400 of EEG's customers presented a high risk of
money-laundering or reputational risk and that approximately ninety-four of these cus-
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Committee and Attorney at Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. Kayla B. McGee is a Compliance
Attorney at CRIF Corporation, Gerardo Calderon is an Attorney at Baker & McKenzie, and Truman K.
Butler is Co-Chair of the International AML Committee and Chief Legal Officer-North America for CRIF
Corporation.
1. About Us, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://www.fca.org.uk/about (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
2. FN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA REFERENCE No. 144036, FSA FINAL NOTICE TO EFG PRIVATE BANK LTD.
1.1 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/efg-private-bank.pdf.
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tomers were politically exposed persons.3 The FSA's investigation found that, although
the bank had AML rules and procedures on paper, the bank had failed to actually imple-
ment those AML controls. 4 The investigation revealed that, between 2007 and 2011,
seventeen out of thirty-six newly opened customer accounts contained explicit money-
laundering risks, including allegations relating to criminal activity, but the bank had failed
to document or take action to mitigate those risks.5 The FSA determined that EFG
breached Principle 3 of the Principles for Businesses, 6 which requires that "a firm [ ] take
reasonable care to organi[z]e and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with ade-
quate risk management systems."7 The FSA also determined that EFG's failings had con-
tinued for a period of three years and were serious enough to mandate a fine of £6
million.8 Because of EFG's cooperation and early settlement, the FCA reduced the fine
by 36 percent to £4.2 million.9
2. Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Ltd. Fined £525,000Jbr Failure to Implement Anti-Money
Laundering Controls
On August 8, 2013, the FCA fined Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Ltd., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Nigerian Guaranty Trust Bank, £525,000 for breaches of Principle 3 of
the FCA's Principles for Businesses.' 0 The FCA found that, between May 19, 2008, and
July 19, 2008, Guaranty Trust Bank had failed to implement an effective AML system and
controls in relation to individuals who were identified as presenting a higher risk of being
involved in money-laundering or terrorist financing.I The FCA also found that there
was an "unacceptable risk" that Guaranty Trust Bank could have been used to launder the
proceeds of crime because of the lack of adequate controls and because Guaranty Trust
Bank provided services to customers in jurisdictions that lack AML regulations.' 2 Guar-
anty Trust Bank agreed to settle the action at an early stage, and, accordingly, the
£525,000 fine reflected a 30 percent discount.13
3. Id. T9 2.4, 4.3, 4.7.
4. Id. T9 2.1-2.4.
5. Id. T 4.13.
6. Id. 1.1.
7. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Principles for Businesses, in FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK 2.1,
2.1.1 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/PRIN.pdf.
8. FN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 2, at TT 2.3, 1.2.
9. Id. T 1.2.
10. FN. CONDUCT AUTH., FRN 466611, FCA FINAL NOTICE TO GUARANTY TRUST BANK (UK) LTD.
1.1 (Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/guaranty-trust-bank-uk -
ltd.pdf.
11. Id. 1.1, 2.4-2.6.
12. Id. T 2.8.
13. Id. T 1.2.
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B. ISRAEL
1. Cartisey Ashrai Le'Israel Fined NIS 6 Million for Failure to Comply with Anti-Money
Laundering Requirements
On October 9, 2013, the Banking Corporations Sanctions Committee (a statutory com-
mittee authorized to impose financial sanctions of up to NIS 2 million for each infringe-
ment on banking corporations as a means of enforcing the prohibition on money
laundering and terrorist financing) imposed a fine of NIS 6 million on the Israeli banking
corporation Cartisey Ashrai Le'Israel (Cal). The fine was imposed based on the examina-
tion and report by the Israeli Banking Supervision Department, which found that Cal had
violated the Banking Corporations' Requirements Regarding Identification, Reporting,
and Record-Keeping to Prevent Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Or-
der 5761-2001). Specifically, the report determined that the company had deficiencies in
both demanding identification documentation and in transferring information to the
Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority. Specifically, the
company failed to (1) verify identification vis-a-vis the Population Registry of bank credit
card holders, (2) report activities that required reporting based on the size and type of
transaction, (3) report a large volume of unusual transactions, and (4) ensure that declara-
tions regarding beneficiaries were in accordance with Order 5761-2001. In determining
the amount of the fine, the Banking Corporations Sanctions Committee took into consid-
eration the fact that the company had taken steps to rectify deficiencies and that it had
replaced its CEO. 14
2. Leumi Card Ltd. Fined NIS 1.2 Million Jbr Failure to Comply with Anti-Money
Laundering Requirements
On October 9, 2013, the Banking Corporations Sanctions Committee imposed a fine of
NIS 1.2 million on Leumi Card Ltd. because of the company's infringements of the Bank-
ing Corporations' Requirements Regarding Identification, Reporting, and Record-Keep-
ing to Prevent Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Order 5761-2001).
The committee determined that Leumi Card Ltd. was inadequately prepared, that it failed
to conduct identification vis-a-vis the Population Registry of bank credit card holders, that
its declarations regarding a beneficiary were not in accordance with Order 5761-2001
requirements, and that it had failed to report unusual transactions and transfer accurate
information to the Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority.
In assessing the fine, the Banking Corporations Sanctions Committee took into account
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III. Legislative Developments and Guidance
A. MEXICO
Following international trends and in response to the Mutual Evaluation conducted by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering In South America, and the International Monetary Fund (IIMF),16 on October
17, 2012, the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with
Funds from Illegal Sources (Mexican AML Law) was published in the Federal Official
Gazette. 17
The Mexican AML Law came into effect on July 17, 2013, and it is intended to enhance
coordination between government authorities and agencies in charge of its enforcement as
well as to provide guidelines for those entities and individuals active in the financial sector
and other activities considered to be "vulnerable" (i.e., those most likely to facilitate
money laundering activities).' 8
The Mexican AML Law establishes reporting obligations for those acts or transactions
that are potentially being used by organized crime with money laundering purposes.' 9
Among the acts or transactions that shall be reported are cash payments involving transac-
tions on high-value assets (precious stones, metals, and jewelry), games and draws, service
cards not issued by financial entities, real estate, art, vehicles (whether used or new), public
notary services, and custom agents, when certain thresholds are met.20 The Mexican
AML Law has incorporated administrative and criminal sanctions for violations.21
On August 16, 2013, the Mexican Ministry of Finance published, in the Federal Official
Gazette, the Regulations of the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of
Transactions with Funds from Illegal Sources (Mexican AML Regulations), which came
into effect on September 1, 2013.22
The Mexican AML Regulations establish provisions for compliance with the Mexican
AML Law and mandate that entities or individuals carrying out "vulnerable activities"
should be registered in the Federal Taxpayers Registry and, among other requirements,
shall have an outstanding Advanced Electronic Signature.2 3 In addition, the Mexican
AML Regulations detail how the filing of notices of "vulnerable activities" shall be accom-
plished, the rules to respond to requests for information issued by the enforcement au-
16. Mutual Evaluation of Mexico, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/coun-
tries/j-un/mexico/documents/mutualevaluationofmexico.hml.
17. Decreto por el que se Expide la Ley Federal para la Prevenci6n e Identificaci6n de Operaciones con
Recursos de Procedencia Ilfcita [Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with
Funds from Illegal Sources], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 17 de Octobre de 2012 (Mex.),
available at http://www.dof.gob.nux/nota-detalle.php?codigo=5273403&fecha= 17/10/2012.
18. Id. arts. 2,3.
19. Id. art. 2.
20. Id. art. 3, ch. VII-X.
21. Id. ch. VII, VIII.
22. Reglamento de la Ley Federal para la Prevenci6n e Identificaci6n de Operaciones con Recursos de
Procedencia Ilfcita [Regulations of the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with
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thorities, and the process associated with the review of potential acts or transactions in
violation of the Mexican AML.
2 4
B. NEW ZEALAND
On June 30, 2013, the new laws strengthening New Zealand's financial system against
serious crime took effect. Justice Minister Judith Collins stated that the Anti-Money
Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (AML/CFT Act) will most
likely make New Zealand safer by helping law enforcement agencies detect and deter
serious crimes, such as drug dealing, tax evasion, and fraud.25
According to Collins, "[tlhe new AML/CFT regime will make it easier to recover
money gained illegally and help close the loopholes that criminals can use to launder
money. It also aligns New Zealand with international laws and best practice and increases
our trading partners' confidence in our financial sector." 26
The Act applies to a range of businesses technically classified as reporting entities, such
as banks, other financial institutions, some financial advisors, and casinos. The reporting
entities have had since 2009 to implement all the required changes, which include check-
ing and verifying customers' identities, assessing the risks that the business faces, adopting
an AML/CFT program, appointing a compliance officer, and reporting suspicious or unu-
sual transactions. Collins stated that the new law is part of a coordinated international
effort to tackle a serious global problem, and New Zealand is advancing systems that mir-
ror those in other countries. 2 7
C. VATICAN CITY
In response to the international community's demands for change, the Vatican passed a
law to make its public finances fully transparent. Archbishop Dominique Mamberti, the
Vatican's foreign minister, said the law would move the Vatican one step closer to meeting
the standards set by the Council of Europe's AML committee. 28
The Holy See Press Office said that the new norm, Legge N. XVIII, "strengthens the
current internal system for the prevention and countering of money laundering and the
financing of terrorism, in conformity with international guidelines."29 Law XVIII imple-
24. Id. chs. 4, 7, 8.
25. Judith Collins, Strengthened Money Laundering Laws Take Effect, NAT'L (June 28, 2013), http://www.
national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=41370.
26. Id.
27. Id. For further information, see Information for Business, MINISTRY OF JUST., www.justice.govt.nz/pol-
icy/criminal-justice/aml-cft/information-for-businesses (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); Anti-Money Laundering &
Countering Financing of Terrorism, RES. BANK OF N.Z., www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation and supervision/amti-
moneylaundering/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
28. Vatican Approves Financial Transparency Law, EURONEWS (Oct. 10, 2013, 6:53 AM), http://www.
euronews.com/2013/10/10/vatican-approves-financial-transparency-law/.
29. See DOMINIQUE MAMBERTI, SECRETARIO PER I RAPPORTI CON ULI STATI, SULLA LEGGE N. XVIII
DELLO STATO DELLA CITTA DEL VATICANO IN MATERA DI TRASPARENZA VIGILANZA E INFORMAZIONE
FINANZIARIA [ON THE LAW OF THE STATE OF THE XVIII VATICAN CITY ON TRANSPARENCY, SUPERVI
SION AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION] (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/secreta-
riat state/2013/documents/rc-seg-st-20131009_mamberti-articolo-esplicativo it.html.
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ments Pope Francis's motu proprio of August 8, 2013, which called for a broadening of
existing Vatican laws on financial supervision.
30
IV. FATF Mechanism to Strengthen Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing Compliance
In February 2013, the FATF issued a new Methodology for assessing technical compli-
ance with the FATF Recommendations. 31 The new Methodology will provide the basis
for an integrated analysis of the extent to which a country is compliant with the FATF
Standards and the level of effectiveness of its AML/CFT system.
32
Bjorn S. Aamo, President of the FATF, stated,
[t] he new Methodology adds a new dimension to the evaluation of countries compli-
ance with FATF-standards. It remains as important as before that all countries imple-
ment the Recommendations of the FATF in their legal systems, however, the new
Methodology lays the foundation for a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of
national systems . . . . The future assessments will determine how well countries
achieve the objective of fighting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 33
"The Methodology will he used by the FATF, the FATF-Style Regional Bodies, and other
assessment bodies such as the IVIF and the World Bank."34
A. U.S. DEVELOPMENTS
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has issued over 195 enforce-
ment actions involving Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and AML Act violations since September
11, 2011. As bank practices have become more complex and technological advances have
made moving money easier, U.S. authorities have ramped up AML enforcement actions
to curb the use of U.S. banks to conduct illicit activities, including drug trafficking and
terrorism. In 2013, many of the violations of the AML Act emerged from large financial
institutions growing into fledgling economies that regulators fear open the door to AML
risks. Although sanctions were imposed for past failures to report suspicious activity, reg-
ulators concentrated on mandating that banks tighten their AML compliance programs
30. See Apostolic Letter issued Motu Proprio by the Supreme Pontiff Francis for the Prevention and Cour-
tering of Money Laundering, the Financing of Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion (Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/francesco/moru-proprio/documents/papa-
francesco-mom-proprio_20130808_prevenzione-contrasto en.html.
31. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AML/CFT SYSTEMS (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF / 20Methodology%/2022 o 20Feb/ %20
2013.pdf.
32. Id. at 4.
33. FATF Issues New Mechanism to Strengthen Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Compliance, FIN.
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and internal controls over punishing unwitting AML or BSA violations with monetary
penalties.
35
B. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND SETTLEMENTS
1. ]PMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In January 2013, the OCC and Federal Reserve entered into a consent cease and desist
order with JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) following the discovery that the bank lacked
meaningful internal controls and a viable BSA/AML compliance program. 36 The OCC
found that JPMC and two of its affiliates lacked "internal controls, independent testing,
customer due diligence, risk assessment and SAR processes (monitoring, investigating, and
decision-making)." 37 The combination of these enterprise-wide compliance failures con-
stituted a violation of the requirement to maintain a BSA and AML compliance pro-
gram. 38 The consent order requires JPMC to review prior Suspicious Activity Report
(SAR) reporting, subject new products to heightened compliance review, and establish
responsibilities for compliance within an independent bank compliance staff.39 This con-
sent order was the culmination of a year-long period of scrutiny surrounding JPMorgan
Chase after it announced $6 billion in losses on credit derivative trading out of its London
office.40 No monetary penalties were included in the consent order.
2. Citigroup
On March 21, 2013, Citigroup found itself the subject of yet another OCC enforce-
ment action-its second in the preceding twelve months. 41 The new consent order
echoed many of the concerns thought to be addressed by previous consent orders sur-
rounding the report of suspicious activities and other internal control gaps leaving room
for money laundering schemes. 42 While the consent order did not impose any monetary
penalties, it set aggressive timelines for development of a BSA/AML compliance system,
requiring a detailed written plan for bolstering compliance within sixty days, and quarterly
reports on the effectiveness of its enterprise-wide compliance program. 4 3
35. Testimony of Thomas]. Cury, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs of the U.S. Senate, 113th Cong. 10 (2013).
36. Consent Order, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Department of the Treasury, Comptroller of the
Currency, AA-EC- 13 -94 (Jan. 14, 2013).
37. Testimony of Thomas ]. Curry, supra note 35, at 16.
38. Id.
39. Consent Order, In re ]PMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., AA-EC- 13-94 at 17, 18, 22, 8.
40. Joe Adler & Rachel Witkowski, Are Regulatory Orders Against]PMorgan Yust a 'Slap on the Wrist'?, Am.
BANKER (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178-10/are-regulatory-orders-
against-jpmorgan-just-a-slap-on-the-wrist- 1055842- 1.html.
41. Aruna Viswantha & David Henry, Fed Orders Citigroup to Improve Money Laundering Checks, REUTERS
(Mar. 26, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-citigroup-moneylaundering-idUS
BRE92POOO20130326.
42. Id.
43. Matt Egan, Fed to Citi: Improve Anti-Money Laundering Controls, FOX Bus. (Mar. 26, 2013), http://
www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2013/03/26/fed-to-citi-improve-anti-money-laundering-controls/.
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3. TCF National Bank
Following a five-year investigation by the OCC of unreported suspicious activity, TCF
National Bank was assessed a $10 million penalty for violations of the BSA on January 25,
2013. 44 The OCC found multiple late-filed suspicious activity reports involving cash
transactions for wire transfers to and from unknown sources. 45 The monetary penalty was
imposed for failure to "adequately explain or identify potential terrorist financing. ' 46
4. TD Bank, N.A.
In September, the OCC and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network imposed a
$3 7.5 million civil penalty against TD Bank for continuous and significant violations of
suspicious activity reporting requirements; 47 this was coupled with a $15 million penalty
and cease and desist for Securities Act violations from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. 4 TD Bank held accounts for Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., the law firm used
by Scott Rothstein to carry out a $1.2 billion Ponzi scheme. 49 Because of the frequency of
use and high volume of money flowing through the accounts, the OCC opined that the
SAR failures were especially egregious to justify the substantial monetary penalties.50 Ad-
ditionally, TD Bank paid $600 million in restitution to the investors who lost money in
the Ponzi scheme. 51
5. FinCEN
In May 2013, FinCEN's Office of Regulatory Analysis reported on a recent assessment
of depository institutions' SAR filings that describe possible money laundering activities
by certified public accountants and associated members of the accounting profession. 52
Accountants and other similar professionals (lawyers, investment brokers, and realtors)
have been referred to as gatekeepers because persons in these professions have the ability
to provide their clientele access to the financial system, which could be used knowingly or
unknowingly for illicit purposes. Accountants have not been designated as "financial insti-
tutions" under the BSA and therefore do not have any obligation to report suspicious
44. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Dep't of the Treasury, OCC Assesses $10
Million Civil Money Penalty Against TCF Nat'l Bank, Bank Secrecy Act Violations Cited (Jan. 25, 2013),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ- 2013- 18.html.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Consent Order, Il re TD Bank, N.A., Department of the Treasury, Comptrolle-r of the Currency, AA-
EC-2013-67, at 2 (Sept. 20, 2013).
48. Id.
49. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Dep't of the Treasury, OCC Assesses
$37,500,000 Penalty Against TD Bank, N.A. for Failures to File Suspicious Activity Reports (Sept. 23, 2013),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ- 2013-145.htrml.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. BSA ADVisORY GRP., FiN. CRiMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW:
TRENDS, Tips, & ISSUES 21 (May 2013), availahie at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/files/sar-tti_23.
pdf. FinCEN is the recognized abbreviation for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FinCEN is the
U.S. financial intelligence unit.
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activity of their clients.5 3 Accountants have maintained that such obligations would inter-
fere with the duty of client confidentiality. As a result, the U.S. accounting profession has
established codes of business standards and ethical conduct that must be observed by
members of the profession.
The FinCEN report found that, because financial transactions are frequently conducted
through several financial institutions in multiple countries and often involve foreign cor-
respondent accounts, it is difficult for depository financial institutions to detect money
laundering activities by accountants and their clients.5 4 FinCEN further reported that
some financial institutions did not file many of the SARs, that were later examined by
FinCEN, until the institution was aware that a law enforcement investigation had been
opened or an indictment of the customer had been made for improper financial activi-
ties. 5 It was stated, however, that once financial institutions became aware of the im-
proper financial activities, they were diligent in searching and reporting the relevant
transactions that have passed through the financial institution's systems.
"SAR filers identified accountants or CPA's as subjects in 227, or 65 percent, of the 350
SARs sampled for the study. 516 The report highlighted that foreign correspondent bank
transfers can enable the laundering of illicit funds through the U.S. financial system and
can hide the source of funds. In one of the examples reported by FinCEN, "a large bank
filed SARs on multiple international companies for suspicious activities conducted
through its correspondent bank customers."5 t Locations for members of the parties to the
transactions included Cyprus, Gibraltar, and the United Kingdom. The bank suspected
that the entities did not exist, although it was assured by one of the banks involved that "it
is common for companies registered in Cyprus to provide the address of its lawyers or
accountants as its business address."58
The FinCEN report concluded that financial institutions have challenges in detecting
some forms of suspicious activities and related transactions. The primary problematic
activities are those where (1) the financial institution does not maintain a direct relation-
ship with the accountant or CPA, such as in correspondent banking transactions; (2) shell
company activities, both in the United States and overseas; and (3) improper trust and
fiduciary transactions, both in the United States and overseas.5 9
In May 2013, FinCEN's Office of Special Program Development reported on the
314(b) program. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed
the USA PATRIOT Act, which was signed into law on October 26, 2001. Among the
tools provided to the business community and law enforcement to combat illicit activities
was section 314(b) of the PATRIOT Act.60 Section 314(b) is a unique tool that empowers
financial institutions or an association of a financial institutions to voluntary share infor-
mation with other financial institutions "for purposes of identifying, and where appropri-
ate, reporting activities that the financial institution or association suspects may involve
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Id. at 25.
57. BSA ADVISORY GRP., supra note 52, at 34.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 40.
60. Id. at 41.
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possible terrorist activity or money laundering. ' 6 1 Once a financial institution or associa-
tion has properly registered with FinCEN, it may share information under the protection
of "safe harbor" from liability to the extent provided under subsection 314(b) of Public
Law 107-56 (the USA PATRIOT Act). 62
FinCEN has stated that the steady rise in section 314(b) filings underscores the ac-
knowledgement by financial institutions and associations that section 314(b) can serve as a
useful tool to support the due diligence and transaction monitoring efforts and enhance
the "Know Your Customer" efforts. Rather than relying upon the limited information
that an institution may have about a customer or activity, the 314(b) participant can access
additional valuable information on the customer's new accounts, activities, business associ-
ates, and the root of complex financial schemes. This information helps an organization
to build a clearer profile of its customers and to accurately rate the risk associated with
certain customers.6 3
C. A CONCENTRATION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
With the scope and effect of AML violations increasing, the OCC has expressed an
intention to place more rigorous concentration on its supervisory functions with regards
to BSA and AML Act violations.64 In analyzing the most efficient means by which to
ensure compliance with AML requirements, the OCC-both in its testimony before the
Banking Affairs Committee and in its recent enforcement actions-has identified corpo-
rate governance as a key to controlling AML violations.6 As highlighted above, many
recent AML enforcement actions involved complex, large financial institutions. While the
individual consent orders placed differing controls on each bank found in violation, orders
have trended toward requiring the documentation of internal compliance programs and
imposing responsibility on senior managers to implement the plan.66
In order to further promote the importance of internal controls over external supervi-
sion, the OCC is drafting guidance to banks on corporate governance, "including business
line accountability for BSA/AML compliance and the independence of the compliance
fumction." 6 7 With pressure around internal controls increasing, bank compliance budgets
are also increasing to prevent incurring penalties in the future for failure of internal con-
trols now. 68 Bank management is now expected to take a proactive approach toward com-
pliance with AMVIL requirements or face the potential for personal liability for bank
compliance failures.69 Consent orders requiring additions to compliance programs this
year could become the basis for future monetary penalties if these megabanks prove them-
selves not up to the increasing corporate governance challenges posed by compliance with
BSA and AML mandates.
61. Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540(b)(4)(i)(A).
62. BSA ADVISORY GRP., supra note 52, at 41; see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540(b)(5)(i).
63. BSA ADVISORY GRP., supra note 52, at 51.
64. Testimony of Thomas ]. Curry, supra note 35.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id.
68. More Banks Facing U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Scrutiny, FITCH RATINGS (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.
fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/More-Banks-Facing?pr id=787636.
69. Testimony of Thomas ]. Curiy, supra note 35, at 12.
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D. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
In October 2013, the FATE and the Group of Twenty Anti-Corruption Working Group
jointly convened an Experts Meeting on Corruption. 70 The meeting included ninety-five
delegates from twenty-seven countries and fifteen organizations. The organizations in-
cluded the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force, Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption, Egmont Group, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Bank, and the
World Customs Organization. The FATF continues to emphasize an anti-corruption
agenda. Part of its work is focused on gathering AML and counter-terrorist financing
experts and anti-corruption experts for the purpose of discussing issues of commonality.
One of the primary areas of focus for the meeting was to "identify key challenges in deter-
mining the beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements in corruption cases,
including the problems caused by a lack of transparency in beneficial ownership
information."71
The FATF and meeting attendees reiterated that countries must recognize the link be-
tween corruption and money laundering. Prosecutors and law enforcement need to un-
derstand that corruption offenses generate proceeds that "can both qualify as instruments
or as the proceeds of corruption the perpetrators of these offences inevitably seek to laun-
der in order to hide their illicit origins."72 The FATF meeting summary noted that trans-
parency is an issue of relevance beyond the fight against corruption and money
laundering; it also impacts questions around tax avoidance, corporate governance, and the
fight against all types of illegal activity.73 The participants expressed strong support for
the best practices paper under development by the FATF on how the FATF Recommen-
dations can be effectively used in the fight against corruption.74
70. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, PRESIDENT'S SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES FROM THE EXERTS' MEETING ON
CORRUPTION 1 (Oct. 12, 2013), availahie at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/statements/Cor-
ruption-Expert-meeting-Oct-2013.pdf.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 5.
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